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QUI TAM AND THE BANK SECRECY ACT: A
PUBLIC-PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT MODEL TO
IMPROVE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING EFFORTS
Giovanni Scarcella*
Cartels, terrorists, fraudsters, and other criminals face a problem: when
they receive the proceeds from their illicit activities, how can they get this
money into their bank accounts without raising regulatory eyebrows? The
Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) has established a complex regulatory regime,
imposing on banks the duty to assess the risks presented by their clients, to
monitor the transactions they process, and to report transactions that contain
indicia of money laundering and other criminal activity to the Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). In response, criminals utilize
increasingly sophisticated means to obfuscate the origins of these
transactions and disguise their illicit nature to enter the U.S. banking system.
Banks thus face a difficult task standing at the front line of anti-money
laundering (AML) detection. Strong financial incentives for banks to neglect
their BSA compliance function compound the difficulties innate to AML
detection. While banks are subject to regular examinations and face fines
for failing to maintain adequate BSA compliance procedures, and while bank
officials can even face imprisonment, the primary federal enforcement
agency, FinCEN, faces perennial resource shortages. Agencies must also
consider a variety of factors when deciding whether to bring an action
against a noncompliant bank. The confluence of these issues leads some
banks to ignore, neglect, or undermine their BSA compliance officials.
This Note proposes a qui tam model within the BSA to provide recourse to
bank BSA compliance personnel who have evidence of violations by their
employers. This model allows private individuals with knowledge of a
violation to bring a claim on behalf of the government, while still providing
for agency oversight through the ability to intervene in or dismiss cases. This
Note argues that qui tam will help increase the amount of BSA enforcement,
ameliorate the resource shortages faced by FinCEN, and preserve regulatory
discretion by allowing FinCEN to transition into a gatekeeper role. This
Note also discusses additional controls unique to the BSA to deter abuse and
maintain effective BSA compliance departments at banks.
* J.D. Candidate, 2022, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2016, George Washington
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INTRODUCTION
On July 6, 2020, the New York State Department of Financial Services
(DFS) issued a consent order against Deutsche Bank AG (“Deutsche Bank”)
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for deficiencies in its anti-money laundering (AML) program. 1 Such an
action would hardly have qualified as news—DFS had issued five such
orders against Deutsche Bank in as many years2—if not for the parties
involved: Deutsche Bank continued to maintain client relationships with
Jeffrey Epstein and related entities “despite repeated indications of
facilitation of improper transactions.”3 Epstein, a financier who faced
allegations of child trafficking and pled guilty to underage prostitution
charges in 2007,4 maintained an account at Deutsche Bank from 2013 until
2018.5
The consent order describes a program that had all the trappings of an
AML compliance function but with little buy-in from bank leadership.6
Although a junior employee prepared a memorandum detailing the
allegations against Epstein and his 2007 plea deal,7 a bank executive
nevertheless approved Epstein’s onboarding without any review by the
bank’s risk committee.8 Despite Deutsche Bank’s classification of Epstein
as a high-risk customer,9 he and his representatives sent dozens of suspicious
transactions to his alleged co-conspirators, as well as Eastern European
women for “school tuition.”10 No minutes exist of a January 2015 risk
committee meeting—in contravention of bank policy—where the committee
determined the relationship with Epstein would continue.11 While the bank
placed mandatory conditions on Epstein’s account to monitor for suspicious
activity and reputational risk,12 these conditions were misinterpreted, or in
some cases, never followed.13
The DFS consent order did not address exactly why Deutsche Bank
employees ignored the risks in continuing their relationship with Epstein, but
emails quoted in the order provide some insight. The relationship manager
who onboarded Epstein emphasized the estimated cash flows of “$100–300
million” that would stem from the accounts, with a possible revenue of “2–4
million annually.”14 Subsequent to the January 2015 risk committee meeting
where Deutsche Bank decided to continue its relationship with Epstein, one
1. See Consent Order Under New York Banking Law §§ 39 and 44, at 32, In re Deutsche
Bank AG, et al. (N.Y. State Dep’t of Fin. Servs. July 6, 2020), https://www.dfs.ny.gov/
system/files/documents/2020/07/ea20200706_deutsche_bank_consent_order.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V2SM-V6LM] [hereinafter Deutsche Bank Consent Order].
2. See Enforcement and Discipline, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS.,
https://www.dfs.ny.gov/industry_guidance/enforcement_actions_lfs
[https://perma.cc/UBD9-2R3H] (last visited Oct. 29, 2021).
3. Deutsche Bank Consent Order, supra note 1, at 3.
4. Id. at 4–5.
5. Id. at 4.
6. See id. at 6–15.
7. Id. at 6–7.
8. Id. at 7–8.
9. Id. at 8.
10. Id. at 9, 15.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 12–13.
13. Id. at 13–14.
14. Id. at 7.
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member of the committee “noted a number of sizable deals recently”
involving Epstein’s accounts.15
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime estimates that up to $2
trillion are laundered globally each year.16 Money laundering involves
placing proceeds from unlawful activity into the banking system, separating
these proceeds from their criminal origin (“layering”), and using seemingly
legitimate transactions to disguise the true nature of these illicit funds
(“integration”).17 Criminals use a variety of sophisticated methods to layer
and integrate their illicit funds, putting financial institutions on the front lines
of AML detection and reporting.18
Federal statutes19 and regulations20 provide a set of requirements that
banks must meet in their AML compliance programs. The Bank Secrecy
Act21 (BSA) is the primary federal statute governing such compliance
programs. Under this regime, banks’ AML compliance responsibilities
generally fall within two categories: reporting and due diligence.22 Banks
that fail in their monitoring and reporting duties face civil and criminal
liability.23 While Deutsche Bank paid a fine of $150 million and faced
additional scrutiny by an independent monitor for its compliance violations,
DFS, a state regulator, imposed these sanctions.24
Despite these regulations, money laundering remains a serious problem.
Approximately $800 billion to $2 trillion are laundered globally each year.25
Offshore shell companies are used not only to evade taxes but to obscure the
activities of criminal organizations and terrorist groups, as well.26 And the
ramifications of money laundering include real human costs. Epstein
15. Id. at 12.
16. See Money Laundering, U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS AND CRIME, https://www.unodc.org/
unodc/en/money-laundering/overview.html [https://perma.cc/WXN6-JLQZ] (last visited Oct.
29, 2021).
17. Steven M. D’Antuono, Section Chief, Crim. Investigative Div., Fed. Bureau of
Investigation, Dep’t of Just., Statement Before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs for Hearing Entitled “Combatting Money Laundering and Other Forms of Illicit
Finance: Regulator and Law Enforcement Perspectives on Reform” (Nov. 29, 2018) (on file
with author).
18. Id.
19. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1786(q), 1818(s), 1829b, 1951–1959; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–1957; 31
U.S.C. §§ 5311–5355.
20. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. §§ 1000–1099 (2021) (describing AML program requirements).
21. Pub. L. No. 91-507, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12, 15, and 31 U.S.C.); see 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5355.
22. See Christina Parajon Skinner, Executive Liability for Anti-Money-Laundering
Controls, 116 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 1, 3 (2016).
23. See Pamela H. Bucy, Epilogue: The Fight Against Money Laundering: A New
Jurisprudential Direction, 44 ALA. L. REV. 839, 850–51 (1993).
24. See Deutsche Bank Consent Order, supra note 1, at 33. Although Deutsche Bank
incurred penalties for violating New York, not federal, regulations, these regulations require
that banks comply with the BSA’s anti-money laundering provisions. See N.Y. COMP. CODES
R. & REGS. tit. 3, § 116.2 (2020).
25. See Money Laundering, supra note 16.
26. See Carmine Franchesca S. Del Mundo, How Countries Seek to Strengthen
Anti-Money Laundering Laws in Response to the Panama Papers, and the Ethical
Implications of Incentivizing Whistleblowers, 40 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS., no. 1, 2019, at 87, 95.
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sexually abused or trafficked dozens of victims, if not more.27 The program
requirements banks must meet under the BSA are meant to deter such
high-risk individuals from processing suspicious transactions through the
U.S. financial system.
Understaffed regulators, institutional decision-making by federal
authorities, and the innate difficulties in money laundering detection all
contribute to the gap between the extensive statutory and regulatory scheme
and the continued shortcomings of banks’ BSA/AML compliance
functions.28 Enforcement officials often point to resource shortages to
explain why so few actions are brought.29 FinCEN has seen its budget slowly
grow and its full-time staff decrease since 2013.30 Critics, including the
Republican staff of the House Committee on Financial Services, have instead
framed this issue as another flavor of the “too big to fail” problem—that
enforcement officials at the U.S. Department of the Treasury (“the
Treasury”) and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) have declined to
enforce violations of the BSA at large financial institutions precisely because
of their size and “systemic importance.”31
Investigating BSA violations takes significant time and resources even
when regulators are monitoring attentively; for example, the Treasury’s
$1 billion settlement with Standard Chartered resulted from a five-year
investigation, even though a deferred prosecution agreement had given
regulators increased visibility into its compliance program. 32
While the BSA imposes its requirements on banks through coercion—by
duties to report suspicious activity or refrain from participating in certain
transactions—until recently, the BSA provided little by the way of rewards.33
Formerly, whistleblowers could only receive a discretionary reward capped

27. See How the Law, the Press and His Victims Finally Caught Up with Jeffrey Epstein,
MIAMI
HERALD
(Dec.
19,
2019),
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/
article238237729.html [https://perma.cc/9YKS-68T3].
28. See infra Part II.A.
29. See Skinner, supra note 22, at 5 (“[T]he problem is one of enforcement—that
regulators lack the resources to monitor banks’ compliance with these regulatory
requirements . . . or worse, bank managers choose to be willfully blind to obvious red flags.”);
see also infra notes 128–32 and accompanying text.
30. Compare FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, PROGRAM SUMMARY BY BUDGET
ACTIVITY,
(2013),
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/266/
12.%20FinCEN%20BIB%20FINAL%20ok.pdf [https://perma.cc/AB2S-XC3F], with FIN.
CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, PROGRAM SUMMARY BY BUDGET ACTIVITY (2021),
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/266/16.-FinCEN-FY-2022-BIB.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AQ34-3PV2].
31. REPUBLICAN STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON FIN. SERVS., 114TH CONG., TOO BIG TO JAIL:
INSIDE THE OBAMA JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’S DECISION NOT TO HOLD WALL STREET
ACCOUNTABLE 12, 33 (2016) [hereinafter TOO BIG TO JAIL].
32. See Eric R. Havian & Michael Ronickher, The Need for Whistleblowers in AML
Enforcement,
BANKING
EXCH.
(Apr.
22,
2019,
11:01
AM),
https://www.bankingexchange.com/news-feed/item/7852-the-need-for-whistleblowers-inaml-enforcement [https://perma.cc/R8YW-7XZF].
33. See Bucy, supra note 23, at 852.
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at the lesser of 25 percent of the criminal fine, civil penalty, or forfeiture
collected, or $150,000.34
These reward provisions paled in comparison to similar programs under
other enforcement regimes. The Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), for example, offers a mandatory reward of 10 to 30 percent of
imposed monetary sanctions to informants.35
Congress included provisions within the U.S. Department of Defense
appropriations bill it passed for fiscal year 2021—the William M. (Mac)
Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 202136
(NDAA)—to “comprehensively update the BSA for the first time in
decades.”37 The NDAA contains amendments to the BSA’s whistleblower
program38 that are “substantially similar to”39 the Coordinating Oversight,
Upgrading and Innovating Technology, and Examiner Reform Act of 201940
(the “COUNTER Act of 2019”) modeled on the SEC’s program. 41
Would increasing the amount paid to informants really improve
enforcement of the BSA? Common sense suggests that increased
whistleblower rewards will beget more whistleblowers. Armed with more
information on banks that neglect their compliance programs under the BSA,
or worse, that willfully facilitate suspicious transactions, regulators will then
bring more cases. Still, this reasoning presumes that the Treasury lacks
visibility into noncompliant financial institutions; yet, this is not wholly
accurate, as banks are subject to regular examinations by federal banking
regulators.42
There are other ways to increase whistleblower involvement beyond
simply increasing the reward amount. The False Claims Act43 (FCA)
includes qui tam provisions44 that allow private individuals to enforce its
terms, with the government permitted to intervene in, or dismiss, claims.45
Following amendments in 1986 that expanded the ability of private citizens
to bring claims on behalf of the United States for fraud against the

34. See 31 U.S.C. § 5323(b), amended by William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 § 6314(a), Pub. L. No. 116-283, 134 Stat. 3388, 4597
(2021) [hereinafter NDAA].
35. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b).
36. Pub. L. No. 116-283, 134 Stat. 3388 (2021) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of the U.S.C.).
37. H.R. REP. NO. 116-617, at 2137 (2020) (Conf. Rep.).
38. See NDAA § 6314, 31 U.S.C. § 5323.
39. H.R. REP. NO. 116-617, at 2136.
40. Coordinating Oversight, Upgrading and Innovating Technology, and Examiner
Reform Act of 2019, H.R. 2514, 116th Cong. § 206 (1st Sess. 2019).
41. See Havian & Ronickher, supra note 32.
42. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
43. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733.
44. “Qui tam” refers to the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege quam pro seipso,
meaning “he who as much for the king as for himself.” See infra note 88 and accompanying
text.
45. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729.
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government,46 the FCA’s qui tam model stimulated discussion about its
benefits and shortcomings as a mixed public-private enforcement model, its
potential for abuse, and its replicability in other fields of law.47
If the BSA is not sufficiently enforced, then it will not be sufficiently
complied with, as banks will face less deterrence against accommodating
money launderers. A qui tam model allows for greater enforcement of the
BSA against recalcitrant banks by knowledgeable private attorneys general
while still preserving a degree of regulatory oversight. Furthermore,
FinCEN’s low staffing levels suggests it is better suited for a gatekeeping
function than as the primary enforcer of BSA actions.
Part I of this Note introduces the AML laws, provides an overview of the
BSA’s old whistleblower provisions and the NDAA’s amendments to these
provisions, and presents the FCA’s qui tam framework. Part II discusses the
current gaps in AML enforcement and analyzes the efficacy of the NDAA’s
newly enacted incentives, as well as the benefits and likely challenges in
utilizing qui tam under the BSA. Part III proposes a qui tam model for BSA
enforcement, taking into account the specific limitations presented by the
BSA and broader scholarly proposals to improve qui tam actions under the
FCA.
I. THE BANK SECRECY ACT AND THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: TWO
APPROACHES TO WHISTLEBLOWING
This part provides an overview of the federal AML laws and how the
NDAA amends these laws, focusing on the requirements that the BSA
imposes on banks to create programs to monitor their transactions and
customers, as well as the NDAA’s enhancements to the BSA’s whistleblower
provisions. This part then reviews critical reception to the SEC’s informant
program to understand how similar strengths and weaknesses in the NDAA’s
whistleblower enhancements may arise. Finally, this part outlines the history
of qui tam actions in England and the United States, particularly focusing on
such actions arising under the FCA.
A. The Bank Secrecy Act Framework
The primary federal statutes governing AML standards and enforcement
are the BSA and the Money Laundering Control Act of 198648 (MLCA).49
The BSA requires individuals, banks, and other financial institutions to keep
records of and report certain transactions for suspected money laundering to
aid criminal, tax, and regulatory investigations, as well as counterterrorism
46. See Christopher M. Alexion, Note, Open the Door, Not the Floodgates: Controlling
Qui Tam Litigation Under the False Claims Act, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 365, 378 (2012).
47. See David Freeman Engstrom, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: Empirical
Analysis of DOJ Oversight of Qui Tam Litigation Under the False Claims Act, 107 NW. L.
REV. 1689, 1690–91 (2013).
48. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
49. See Bucy, supra note 23, at 840.
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efforts.50 The MLCA imposes criminal and civil liability on a party who
engages in the act of money laundering—concealing proceeds derived from
unlawful activity through transporting money between the United States and
abroad or avoiding transaction reporting requirements.51 Crucially, the
MLCA supplements the reporting and recordkeeping requirements of the
BSA by requiring banks to establish procedures “reasonably designed” to
ensure compliance with these provisions of the BSA.52
The BSA also directs the president and relevant executive agencies to
develop anti-money laundering strategies.53 Pursuant to this directive, the
Treasury issues regulations that detail more particularized BSA compliance
program requirements.54 Such regulations direct banks to, inter alia,
establish a BSA compliance program,55 file Suspicious Activity Reports
(SARs) when they detect violations of the BSA in the form of suspicious
transactions,56 and conduct enhanced due diligence programs for high-risk
correspondent accounts57 and private banking accounts.58
Several government agencies have roles in implementing and enforcing
the BSA. FinCEN is a bureau within the Treasury that “issues regulations
and interpretive guidance, provides outreach to regulated industries, supports
the examination functions performed by federal banking agencies, and
pursues civil enforcement actions when warranted.”59 Federal banking
agencies—including the Board of Governors Federal Reserve System
(“Federal Reserve”), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),
National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), and Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)—examine banks within their respective
jurisdictions.60 States also maintain their own AML enforcement agencies,
such as DFS in New York.61
In practice, examiners from these agencies assess whether BSA/AML
compliance programs include internal controls to ensure compliance,
establish independent testing mechanisms, designate individuals responsible
for compliance responsibilities, provide for training, and establish procedures

50. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5355.
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a).
52. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(s).
53. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5341–5342.
54. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. §§ 1000–1099 (2021) (requiring banks to, inter alia, conduct due
diligence to understand the true owners of their customers’ accounts and report suspicious
activity to the Treasury).
55. See 12 C.F.R. § 21.21 (2021).
56. Id. § 21.11.
57. See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.610 (2021).
58. Id. § 1010.620.
59. FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, BANK SECRECY ACT/ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING EXAMINATION MANUAL intro., at 5 (2015).
60. Id. at 4–5.
61. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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for customer identification and customer due diligence, including
compliance with beneficial ownership requirements.62
The BSA imposes both civil and criminal penalties for violations of its
reporting requirements.63
In criminal prosecutions, individuals—
particularly partners, directors, officers, or employees of financial
institutions—face a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment and a
$250,000 fine for willful violations of the BSA or related regulations, and
financial institutions can face fines of $1 million per violation.64 The NDAA
includes additional fines equal to the profit gained by a criminal violator, as
well as a mechanism for financial institution employees to repay any bonus
received to the financial institution if the employee committed a criminal
violation.65 Civil penalties can reach $100,000 per violative transaction.66
Under the NDAA’s amendments, repeat violators now face an additional
civil penalty up to triple the profit gained or loss avoided by the violation or
double the maximum penalty for the violation.67
States also maintain anti-money laundering laws that carry their own
penalties. For example, New York law requires banks to establish
anti-money laundering programs that comply with the BSA.68 Banks in New
York that fail to comply with the BSA’s anti-money laundering provisions
face fines or even revocation of their license by DFS.69
The BSA formerly provided that a whistleblower whose information leads
to a recovery greater than $50,000 may, at the secretary of the Treasury’s
discretion, receive a reward of no greater than $150,000.70 The federal AML
regime continues to bar government employees who provide information in
the performance of their employment from reward eligibility after the
passage of the NDAA.71 While the BSA had prohibited banks from
discriminating against Treasury informants and provided a civil cause of
action in the event of such discrimination,72 the NDAA repeals § 5328 and

62. See Assessing the BSA/AML Compliance Program Introduction, in FED. FIN. INSTS.
EXAMINATION COUNCIL, BANK SECRECY ACT/ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING EXAMINATION
MANUAL (2015).
63. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 5321–5322.
64. Id. § 5322; see also 31 C.F.R. §§ 1010.820, 1010.840 (2021).
65. See NDAA § 6312, 31 U.S.C. § 5322(e).
66. See 31 U.S.C. § 5321.
67. See NDAA § 6309, 31 U.S.C. § 5321(f).
68. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 3, § 116.2 (2021).
69. See N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 39, 40, 44 (McKinney 2021).
70. See 31 U.S.C. § 5323(a)–(b).
71. Compare id. § 5323I (“An officer or employee of the United States, a State, or a local
government who provides information . . . in the performance of official duties is not eligible
for a reward . . . .”), with NDAA § 6314(a), 31 U.S.C. § 5323 (“No award . . . may be made []
to . . . a member, officer, or employee [] of [] (I) an appropriate regulatory or banking agency;
(II) the Department of the Treasury or the Department of Justice; or (III) a law enforcement
agency; . . . acting in the normal course of the job duties of the whistleblower.”).
72. See 31 U.S.C. § 5328.
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requires that an employee alleging discrimination first file a complaint with
the secretary of Labor.73
B. The NDAA’s Whistleblower Amendments
As the NDAA reforms “the BSA for the first time in decades,”74 it offers
a comprehensive set of changes addressing several facets of the BSA.75
Among its notable provisions, the NDAA overhauls the BSA’s
whistleblower program.76 In any “judicial or administrative action brought
by the Secretary” or attorney general under the BSA that results in penalties,
disgorgement, or interest exceeding $1 million, the secretary may award a
whistleblower who voluntarily provided original information77 that led to the
successful enforcement of said action up to 30 percent of the amount
collected.78
In determining the award amount within the above parameters, Congress
requires the secretary to consider “the significance of the information
provided by the whistleblower” to the action’s success, “the degree of

73. See NDAA § 6314(a), 31 U.S.C. § 5323 (prohibiting discrimination and requiring an
individual alleging discrimination to “fil[e] a complaint with the Secretary of Labor,” but “if
the Secretary of Labor has not issued a final decision within 1280 days of the filing of a
complaint . . . and there is no showing that such a delay is due to the bad faith of the claimant,”
allowing the claimant to sue in federal district court); see also id. § 6314(b) (“Section 5328 of
title 31, United States Code, is repealed.”).
74. H.R. REP. NO. 116-617, at 2137 (2020) (Conf. Rep.).
75. See generally NDAA, Pub. L. No. 116-283, §§ 6001–511, 134 Stat. 3388, 4547–633
(2021) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). That many of these reforms
are outside, or tangential to, the scope of this Note makes them no less significant in altering
the landscape of the federal AML laws. In addition to the changes discussed above, see supra
notes 65, 67, 71, 73, and accompanying text, the NDAA “broaden[s] the mission of the BSA
to specifically safeguard national security as well as the more traditional investigatory pursuits
of law enforcement.” H.R. REP. NO. 116-617, at 2137. The NDAA “requires more routine and
systemic coordination, communication, and feedback among financial institutions, regulators,
and law enforcement to identify suspicious financial activities.” Id. The NDAA also
“establishes a critical feedback loop and improved routine reporting requirements, to ensure
that resources are directed effectively and that [the above stakeholders] better communicate
and coordinate on BSA-AML priorities, collection methods, and outcomes.” Id. at 2137–38.
The NDAA fosters this communication in part by allowing for greater data sharing among and
within financial institutions and their affiliates. Id. at 2138. In addition, following the passage
of the NDAA, the secretary “must consider, when imposing SAR reporting requirements, the
benefits and burdens of specific requirements and whether the reporting is likely to be ‘highly
useful’ to law enforcement and national security efforts.” Id. The NDAA also expands the
coverage of the BSA to include the antiquities trade. Id. Further, the NDAA adds $10 million
to FinCEN’s budget and requires entities to report and disclose information regarding their
beneficial owners to the Treasury. Id. at 2139. The NDAA defines a “beneficial owner” of an
entity as “an individual who, directly or indirectly, . . . exercises substantial control over the
entity; or [] owns or controls not less than 25 percent of the ownership interests of the entity.”
NDAA § 6403(a), 31 U.S.C. § 5336.
76. See NDAA § 6314(a), 31 U.S.C. § 5323.
77. The NDAA defines “original information” as information derived from the
whistleblower’s “independent knowledge or analysis” not known from any other source and
not exclusively derived from “an allegation made in a judicial or administrative hearing, in a
governmental report, hearing, audit or investigation, or from the news media.” Id.
78. Id.
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assistance provided by the whistleblower” and the whistleblower’s legal
representative, the Treasury’s interest “in deterring violations” of the BSA,
as well as additional factors the secretary “may establish by rule or
regulation.”79
In addition to the prohibition on awards to government employees,80 the
NDAA also bars the secretary from awarding a whistleblower:
(1) “convicted of a criminal violation related to the judicial or administrative
action for which the whistleblower otherwise could receive an award”;
(2) “who fails to submit information to the Secretary or the Attorney General,
as applicable, in such form as the Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney
General, may, by rule, require”; or (3) who knowingly and willfully provides
false information.81
The SEC’s whistleblower program provided the basis for the NDAA’s
whistleblower amendments.82 Under section 922 of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), enacted in
2010, Congress required the SEC to create a whistleblower program with
rewards of 10 to 30 percent of the recovered penalty.83 While the NDAA’s
whistleblower amendments largely mirror the provisions of the SEC’s
program, they differ in one key respect: the NDAA does not include the 10
percent reward floor provided by the SEC’s whistleblower regime.84
Prior to the 2010 legislation, the SEC expressed disappointment regarding
the lack of success of its “practically unknown” whistleblower program,
which only applied to insider trading violations.85 From the inception of the
new regime in 2010 through September 2019, the SEC collected over
$2 billion in sanctions from actions brought with information from
whistleblowers and awarded approximately $387 million to sixty-seven
informants.86 By December 18, 2020, that total ballooned to approximately
$735 million awarded to 127 individuals.87

79. Id.
80. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
81. NDAA § 6314(a), 31 U.S.C. § 5323.
82. See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text.
83. See Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1841–48 (2010) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6).
84. Compare NDAA § 6314(a), 31 U.S.C. § 5323 (capping awards at “an aggregate
amount equal to not more than 30 percent, in total, of what has been collected of the monetary
sanctions imposed in the action or related actions”), with 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1) (providing
for an award “not less than 10 percent” and “not more than 30 percent, in total of what has
been collected of the monetary sanctions imposed in the action or related actions”).
85. See U.S. SEC, OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., ASSESSMENT OF THE SEC’S BOUNTY
PROGRAM 4 (2010).
86. See U.S. SEC, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 1
(2019).
87. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Issues Multiple Whistleblower Awards Totaling over
$3.6 Million (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-325
[https://perma.cc/9BZX-WQDB].
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C. Qui Tam Actions and the False Claims Act
Qui tam actions have existed under English and American law for 700
years. Today, qui tam provisions survive in the United States under the False
Claims Act (FCA). This section details qui tam actions’ rich history in the
law, tracks their development into their modern form under the FCA, and
explains how such actions are brought.
1. The Historical Foundations of Qui Tam
Stemming from the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege quam pro
seipso,88 qui tam actions have a long history rooted in both English and
American common law. Qui tam suits began in the thirteenth century in
England as a way of bringing actions that combined public and private
interests.89 Qui tam plaintiffs bringing such actions under the common law
sued for both their private interest, as well as for the king’s interest.90 Private
parties bringing qui tam actions under the common law fell into two
categories: (1) aggrieved parties suing for redress primarily because of a
personal wrong committed against them and (2) informers motivated by
recovering a portion of the penalty levied against parties for a private wrong
that affected the king’s interests.91
As common law qui tam actions became less common in the fourteenth
century, the English Parliament began enacting statutes that allowed private
parties to bring claims to address public wrongs.92 While some of these
statutes required plaintiffs to demonstrate that they suffered injury, others
allowed any informer to bring suit.93 Although these actions proved crucial
to enforcing England’s penal laws in the absence of an adequate police force,
outrage over abuse of qui tam actions by informers caused Parliament to
place restrictions on qui tam from the fifteenth through seventeenth
centuries.94
By the time the American colonies adopted English law, significant
confusion surrounded qui tam actions.95 Two forms of statutory qui tam
actions were commonplace for both aggrieved parties and unharmed
informers, who could receive remedies and a share of the penalty,
respectively.96 These suits could be brought in civil or criminal
proceedings.97 While no evidence suggests that common law qui tam suits
could be brought in America, several colonies expressly adopted English
statutes in their entirety, which allowed for qui tam procedures to enforce
88. “He who as much for the king as for himself.” Note, The History and Development of
Qui Tam, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 81, 83.
89. See id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 84–85.
92. Id. at 85–86.
93. Id. at 86.
94. Id. at 86–88.
95. Id. at 91.
96. Id. at 90–91.
97. Id. at 91.
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their provisions.98 Early American legislatures also passed statutes that
permitted informers or aggrieved parties to sue qui tam, while other statutes
provided rewards to informants without permitting informants to sue.99 By
the end of the nineteenth century, as public agencies and law enforcement
became more effective, legislatures and courts placed restrictions on qui tam
provisions or removed them outright.100 In the presence of adequate public
enforcement mechanisms, legislatures had little or no need for private
individuals to enforce the criminal law by civil action, and such a regime
conflicted with prosecutorial discretion.101
2. The Development of the False Claims Act
By 1943, the only federal statute containing qui tam provisions still in use
was the False Claims Act.102 Congress originally enacted the FCA in 1863
at the height of the Civil War to incentivize fraudsters to inform on their
coconspirators seeking to defraud the U.S. government as it handed out
contracts to support the war effort.103 The FCA’s qui tam provisions allow
private individuals with knowledge of fraud against the U.S. government to
file lawsuits on behalf of the United States for violations of the FCA.104
Congress amended the FCA several times between 1943 and 2010. To
limit abuse in qui tam suits, Congress amended the FCA in 1943 to bar suits
“based upon evidence or information in the possession of the United
States . . . at the time such suit was brought.”105 Yet, this limitation proved
unworkable in situations in which states were required by statute to provide
such information to the federal government, as it barred the state from
bringing an FCA claim. Where the federal government possessed
information of a fraud, the qui tam informant plaintiff, known as a relator,
who was the original source of this information, could not maintain an FCA
suit.106 To correct this scenario, in 1986, Congress provided an exemption
to the above bar under the FCA if “the person bringing the action is an
original source of the information.”107 In the 1986 amendments, Congress
intended to stem the recent increase in government-contractor fraud by
providing the government with more effective tools and incentivizing
whistleblowers to come forward.108

98. Id. at 94.
99. Id. at 95.
100. Id. at 101.
101. Id. at 101 & n.113.
102. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733; see also The History and Development of Qui Tam,
supra note 88, at 100, 102 & n.116.
103. See Alexion, supra note 46, at 371.
104. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b).
105. Alexion, supra note 46, at 374 (quoting Act of December 23, 1943, 57 Stat. 608,
recodified in 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4) (1982) (superseded)).
106. Id. at 375–77.
107. Id. at 378 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)).
108. Id.
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With the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act109
(ACA) in 2010, Congress again amended the definition of “original source”
under the FCA.110 As of the 2010 amendments, an original source is one
who: (1) voluntarily disclosed the information prior to a public disclosure or
(2) has independent knowledge of the publicly disclosed information that
materially adds to this information and has voluntarily provided the
information to the government before commencing the suit.111
3. The Current State of Qui Tam Actions Under the False Claims Act
Under the current FCA, any person who defrauds the U.S. government is
liable for a civil penalty of $5,000 to $10,000, plus triple the damages the
fraud caused the government.112 The FCA tasks the attorney general with
investigating violations.113 A person may also bring a civil action for
violations of the FCA in the name of the government, which may be
dismissed only with the written consent of the court and attorney general.114
When a private individual files such an action, the complaint remains
under seal for at least sixty days, during which time the government may
decide to intervene and proceed with the action itself.115 If the government
intervenes, it may prosecute the action, but it may also dismiss the claim or
settle with the defendant without consideration of any objections by the
relator and irrespective of intervention.116 While the relator may call
witnesses and continue to participate in the litigation, the government can
even impose limitations on the relator’s participation if the government
demonstrates that such actions will interfere with its prosecution.117 The
FCA requires the court to dismiss an action if
substantially the same allegations or transactions as alleged in the action or
claim were publicly disclosed—(i) in a Federal criminal, civil, or
administrative hearing in which the Government or its agent is a party; (ii)
in a congressional, Government Accountability Office, or other Federal
report, hearing, audit, or investigation; or (iii) from the news media, unless

109. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of the U.S.C.).
110. Alexion, supra note 46, at 395.
111. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
112. Id. § 3729(a)(1). The statute specifies six categories of fraudulent activity: (1) false
or fraudulent claims, id. § 3729(a)(1)(A); (2) false records or statement material to such
claims, id. § 3729(a)(1)(B); (3) underpayment, id. § 3729(a)(1)(D); (4) delivery of false
receipts, id. § 3729(a)(1)(E); (5) buying government property from an unauthorized
government employee, id. § 3729(a)(1)(F); and (6) false or avoided payments to the
government, id. § 3729(a)(1)(G). The statute also imposes liability on anyone who conspires
to commit any of the above violations. Id. § 3729(a)(1)(C).
113. Id. § 3730(a).
114. Id. § 3730(b)(1).
115. Id. § 3730(b)(2), (4).
116. Id. § 3730(c)(1), (2)(A)–(B).
117. Id. § 3730(c)(2)(C).
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the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the
action is an original source of the information. 118

The qui tam relator is entitled to 15 to 25 percent of the proceeds collected
if the government intervenes and 25 to 30 percent of proceeds if it does not,
plus fees and costs.119 In fiscal year 2019, whistleblowers filed 633 qui tam
actions in which the DOJ recovered over $2.1 billion.120
II. CHALLENGES IN BSA ENFORCEMENT AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
This part outlines some of the issues in BSA enforcement that stem from
both regulators and regulated parties and examines how changes to the BSA’s
treatment of whistleblowers can ameliorate these issues. After detailing the
challenges present in BSA enforcement and compliance in Part II.A, Parts
II.B and II.C assess the efficacy of the NDAA’s whistleblower enhancements
and a qui tam model, respectively.
A. Gaps and Challenges in Bank Secrecy Act Enforcement
Effective financial regulation requires accountability and buy-in from all
parties: regulators need to act when they identify misconduct, and regulated
parties need to establish compliance programs that amount to more than just
“window dressing.”121 Despite an abundance of regulations, the threat of
fines or criminal prosecution, and an increasing number of examiners,122
regulators face barriers to enforcement outside their control, including
personnel limitations and resource shortages.123 When it comes to enforcing
the BSA against the largest banks, however, regulators have been slow or
reluctant to act.124 And even with effective enforcement, banks too often
treat monetary fines as merely the cost of doing business.125

118. Id. § 3730(e)(4)(A). The government may also oppose this dismissal to keep the
relator’s claim in court. Id.
119. Id. § 3730(d)(1)–(2).
120. See Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Recovers over $3 Billion from
False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2019 (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/justice-department-recovers-over-3-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2019
[https://perma.cc/5F5W-232Q].
121. Justin O’Brien & Olivia Dixon, The Common Link in Failures and Scandals at the
World’s Leading Banks, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 941, 971–72 (2013) (discussing various
financial crime failures at banks, including AML compliance failures).
122. Compare Occupational Employment and Wages May 2019—Financial Examiners,
U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/oes/2019/may/oes132061.htm
[https://perma.cc/3KZK-QV3Q] (July 6, 2020) (64,550 financial examiners), with
Occupational Employment and Wages May 2018—Financial Examiners, U.S. BUREAU OF
LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/oes/2018/may/oes132061.htm [https://perma.cc/UR9C4HUR] (Mar. 29, 2019) (58,590 financial examiners).
123. See O’Brien & Dixon, supra note 121, at 970; see also Skinner, supra note 22, at 5
(“[T]he problem is one of enforcement—that regulators lack the resources to monitor banks’
compliance with these regulatory requirements . . . or worse, bank managers choose to be
willfully blind to obvious red flags.”).
124. See TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 31, at 26–27, 39.
125. See O’Brien & Dixon, supra note 121, at 964.
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1. Enforcement at the Federal Level
As this section sets out, evidence suggests that federal regulators have
greater opportunity to enforce the BSA than current enforcement levels
suggest. The resulting underenforcement appears to stem from a lack of
resources and a reluctance to hold larger financial institutions accountable
due to concerns of the possible ramifications on the U.S. and global economy.
a. Indicia of Underenforcement
Determining whether federal regulators and prosecutors underenforce the
BSA against financial institutions with faulty compliance programs is a
difficult analytical endeavor. Such an assessment flows from the
presumption that there exists some ideal level of enforcement—the number
of civil and criminal actions needed to bring each bank’s BSA compliance
function into conformity with federal regulations and standards. Yet the gap
between this ideal level of enforcement and the number of enforcement
actions taken will always exist, and determinations of both how large a gap
is acceptable and what an ideal enforcement environment looks like are
subjective.126
Furthermore, overenforcement can occur when the
implementation of the BSA generates more harm than necessary in achieving
the goal of effective AML monitoring.127 With these caveats in mind, several
factors indicate that federal enforcement authorities could be doing more to
bring financial institutions into compliance with the BSA.
First, comparing state enforcement of AML laws against financial
institutions to federal enforcement helps contextualize the broader
environment of noncompliance. In 2016, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the
Southern District of New York (“Southern District”) issued a press release
detailing the Southern District’s impressive haul of approximately $12
billion in forfeitures and civil actions from January 1, 2014, through
December 31, 2015.128 Of this amount, only $2 billion stemmed from actions
that included charges that certain banks violated the BSA.129 Over this same
time period, available enforcement data indicates that FinCEN collected
approximately $561 million in civil penalties for violations of the BSA
126. As Benjamin M. Lawsky, former superintendent of DFS succinctly explained,
regulators “will always run slightly behind [financial firms]—it is just a matter of how far.”
Benjamin Lawsky, Superintendent, N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., Remarks on Financial
Regulation in New York City at Columbia Law School (Feb. 25, 2015),
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/speeches/sp150225.htm [http://perma.cc/Z89X-26YJ].
127. See Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. L.J. 1743, 1744
(2005). Overenforcement of the BSA can occur, for example, when it actually undermines
the valuable role banks play in monitoring transactions and customer behavior for money
laundering. See infra Part II.C.2.c.
128. See Press Release, Justice Department, U.S. Attorney’s Offices, U.S. Attorney’s
Office for the Southern District Of New York Recovers Nearly $12 Billion in Forfeitures and
Civil Actions During Two-Year Period from January 1, 2014, Through December 31, 2015
(Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/us-attorney-s-office-southern-districtnew-york-recovers-nearly-12-billion-forfeitures [https://perma.cc/5SFV-5BJ5].
129. Id.
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nationwide.130 In contrast, actions by DFS, a New York state agency with
considerable jurisdictional overlap with the Southern District, returned about
$7.4 billion in fines and restitution, with approximately $4.2 billion
stemming from actions involving deficiencies in banks’ AML programs.131
This discrepancy illustrates the more expansive landscape of BSA
noncompliance that federal enforcement officials are missing.132
Next, issues arising from agencies’ frequent use of deferred prosecution
agreements (DPAs) in BSA enforcement, while by no means dispositive
proof of underenforcement, can serve to illustrate some of the shortcomings
of federal authorities. A DPA is “[a] contractual arrangement between a US
government agency . . . and a company or an individual facing a criminal or
civil investigation.”133 The agency simultaneously charges the defendant
and requests postponement of the prosecution so the defendant has the
opportunity to demonstrate remediation of the alleged violations.134 DPAs
typically include the imposition of fines, admission of relevant facts, and
commitments to enter compliance with the alleged violation of law,
sometimes overseen by an independent monitor.135 Of eighteen financial
institutions that entered into DPAs for AML and sanctions violations since
2010, four went on to violate the law again, and the government responded
in two instances by simply renewing the DPA.136 These financial institutions
130. See Enforcement Actions, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, https://www.fincen.gov/
news-room/enforcement-actions [https://perma.cc/U26X-6ZW9] (last visited Oct. 29, 2021).
131. See Enforcement and Discipline, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS.,
https://www.dfs.ny.gov/industry_guidance/enforcement_actions_lfs [https://perma.cc/DJ6R57GQ] (last visited Oct. 29, 2021). This amount stems from consent orders entered into
between DFS and: (1) BNP Paribas (June 30, 2014); (2) Standard Chartered, New York
branch (Aug. 19, 2014); and (3) Commerzbank AG (Mar. 12, 2015). See Consent Order Under
New York Banking Law § 44, at 18, In re BNP Paribas, S.A. New York Branch (N.Y. State
Dep’t of Fin. Servs. June 30, 2014), https://www.dfs.ny.gov/system/files/documents/
2020/04/ea140630_bnp_paribas.pdf [https://perma.cc/7X6C-MAH3]; Consent Order Under
New York Banking Law §§ 39 and 44, at 3, In re Standard Chartered Bank, New York Branch
(N.Y. Sate Dep’t of Fin. Servs. Aug. 19, 2014), https://www.dfs.ny.gov/system/files/
documents/2020/04/ea140819_standard_chartered.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X4ML-P6QK];
Consent Order Under New York Banking Law §§ 39 and 44, at 16, In re Commerzbank AG,
et al. (N.Y. Sate Dep’t of Fin. Servs. Mar. 12, 2015), https://www.dfs.ny.gov/system/files/
documents/2020/04/ea150312_commerzbank.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6QP-8EE2].
132. While targeted cooperation between federal and state authorities may help explain this
gap, the relationship between the Southern District—as well as the DOJ more broadly—and
DFS has been marked not just by cooperation, but also by competition. See, e.g., Kenneth S.
Rosenzweig, Note, Regulation of Foreign Banks Operating in the United States: A State
Regulator’s Controversial Pursuit of a London-Based Bank, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
1021, 1032–34 (2013) (noting that DFS pursued regulatory action against Standard Chartered
as DOJ decided not to file criminal charges); TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 31, at 20–21
(observing that DOJ and federal regulators “scrambl[ed]” to complete their investigations of
HSBC to ensure they would bring enforcement actions before DFS). Federal authorities may
also simply exercise more selectivity in their enforcement efforts.
133. THOMSON REUTERS PRACTICAL L., GLOSSARY: DEFERRED PROSECUTION AGREEMENT
(DPA) (2021).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See Jason Leopold et al., The FinCEN Files, BUZZFEED NEWS (Sept. 20, 2020),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/jasonleopold/fincen-files-financial-scandal-criminal-
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included major banks such as JPMorgan Chase & Co., Standard Chartered,
Deutsche Bank, Bank of New York Mellon, and HSBC Bank USA
(“HSBC”).137
The case study of how HSBC entered into its DPA is instructive as to some
of the issues commonplace in federal BSA enforcement. In 2012, the U.S.
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations found that the OCC failed
to correct problems in HSBC’s AML program despite conducting regular
examinations.138 The subcommittee determined that this failure stemmed in
part from the OCC’s decision to cite AML compliance failures as “Matter[s]
Requiring Attention” instead of violations of law,139 its use of infrequent and
compartmentalized examination procedures that did not account for the
program as a whole,140 and its reluctance to use enforcement actions to
prescribe informal remedies of identified problems.141 The subcommittee
blamed OCC supervisors and enforcement, noting that examiners actually
identified many of the problems in HSBC’s compliance program that
enforcement officials declined to act on.142
Later that year, HSBC entered into a DPA with the DOJ in which it agreed
to pay $1.9 billion in penalties stemming from its “blatant failure to
implement proper anti-money laundering controls [leading to] the laundering
of at least $881 million in drug proceeds through the U.S. financial
system.”143 Yet even this DPA included some controversy—DOJ continued
to negotiate with counsel for HSBC well past the attorney general’s
“take-it-or-leave-it” offer and deadline.144 The final DPA included revisions
that shielded HSBC employees and executives from future prosecution for
certain identified violations and left the door open for executives overseeing
continuing deficiencies at the bank’s AML program to keep their bonuses.145
Under the DPA, HSBC agreed to oversight by an independent monitor
who submitted annual reviews of the bank’s AML program to prosecutors.146
networks [https://perma.cc/3A36-N397]. Congress has appeared to take note of this issue, as
under the NDAA’s amendments, repeat violators now face penalties triple the profit gained or
double the maximum penalty. See NDAA § 6309, 31 U.S.C. § 5321(f).
137. See Leopold et al., supra note 136.
138. See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., U.S.
VULNERABILITIES TO MONEY LAUNDERING, DRUGS, AND TERRORIST FINANCING: HSBC CASE
HISTORY 8 (2012).
139. Id. at 321–25.
140. Id. at 325–28.
141. Id. at 328–29.
142. Id. at 334.
143. Press Release, Dep’t of Just., HSBC Holdings Plc. and HSBC Bank USA N.A. Admit
to Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Violations, Forfeit $1.256 Billion in Deferred
Prosecution Agreement (Dec. 11, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hsbc-holdings-plcand-hsbc-bank-usa-na-admit-anti-money-laundering-and-sanctions-violations
[https://perma.cc/DUS4-BUM7].
144. TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 31, at 19–20.
145. Id.
146. See Spencer Woodman, HSBC Moved Vast Sums of Dirty Money After Paying Record
Laundering Fine, INT’L CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Sept. 21, 2020),
https://www.icij.org/investigations/fincen-files/hsbc-moved-vast-sums-of-dirty-money-afterpaying-record-laundering-fine/ [https://perma.cc/T5AC-4VC3].
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An investigation revealed, however, that while under monitorship and
probation, AML compliance officers at HSBC faced serious obstacles in
bringing the bank’s program into compliance.147 Former compliance officers
maintained that HSBC did not give their departments sufficient time to
conduct investigations, that non-U.S. HSBC branches often ignored requests
for basic beneficial owner information about their customers, and that they
had little power to close problematic customer accounts.148 These issues led
to the filing of SARs that lacked basic identifying customer information on
over 6800 transactions totaling $1.5 billion that were processed through
HSBC’s Hong Kong branch, with $900 million of that total involving shell
companies linked to criminal activity, as identified by the International
Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ).149 Despite these and other
issues, in 2017, the DOJ ended its DPA with HSBC, a move that “stunned”
a former senior AML executive at the bank who believed issues at the Hong
Kong branch—the “epicenter” of HSBC’s financial crime problems—were
“largely untouched” while the bank was under monitorship.150 Enforcement
data and the use of DPAs suggests that there is greater opportunity for federal
authorities to prosecute banks for violations of the BSA, yet resource
shortages and the decision to account for possible secondary effects of BSA
enforcement limit prosecutors’ ability to bring actions.
b. Factors Underlying the Current Level of Enforcement
Several reasons have been proffered by observers, regulators, and
policymakers to explain underenforcement of the BSA. Federal banking
regulators face an “extremely broad expanse of issues,”151 and the BSA
applies to a wide range of financial institutions.152 Yet, enforcement officials
often face resource shortages,153 in the form of limited financial resources,
staffing, and enforcement tools.154 FinCEN’s budget had only grown by

147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Lawsky, supra note 126.
152. The BSA applies to FDIC-insured banks, commercial banks, trust companies, private
bankers, branches of foreign banks operating in the United States, credit unions, thrift
institutions, brokers, dealers, investment bankers, investment companies, currency exchanges,
money service businesses, credit card operators, insurance companies, precious metals
dealers, pawnbrokers, loan companies, travel agencies, telegraph companies, automobile
dealers, real estate brokers, the U.S. Postal Service, and casinos, to name a few. See 31 U.S.C.
§ 5312(a)(2).
153. See Skinner, supra note 22, at 5 (“[T]he problem is one of enforcement—that
regulators lack the resources to monitor banks’ compliance with these regulatory
requirements . . . or worse, bank managers choose to be willfully blind to obvious red flags.”).
154. See O’Brien & Dixon, supra note 121, at 970 (noting that the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development and the Australian Government Productivity
Commission have identified several factors to evaluate the quality of a regulatory system,
including “the number of regulators and scope of the regulation for which each is responsible;
extent of independence and policymaking responsibilities; and resources, enforcement tools,
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about 3 percent from 2013 to 2019, from $111.5 million to $115 million.155
The budget for fiscal year 2020 provides a significant windfall for the
agency’s resources: $124.7 million—an 8.4-percent increase.156 In
recognition of this, the NDAA provides for an additional $10 million for
FinCEN’s budget.157
Yet, FinCEN currently employs fewer full-time staff than it did in 2013.158
As for enforcement tools, several observers have noted the sparse
mechanisms that facilitate BSA compliance and have proposed several
additional tools, including increasing enforcement against individual bank
executives,159 regular auditing of banks’ AML software systems,160
market-based creation of industry standards by private interest groups,161 and
corporate codes of conduct for financial services akin to the concept of
corporate social responsibility in the areas of labor and human rights.162
Although some of the above resource limitations fall outside the control of
federal enforcement officials, when authorities have identified and
prosecuted violations of the BSA, the use of DPAs and non-prosecution
agreements (NPAs) against large financial institutions has, at times, allowed
banks and their executives to skirt responsibility for enabling or passively
permitting criminals to launder money through their systems. In testimony
before the Senate Judiciary Committee, then–Attorney General Eric Holder
observed in March 2013 that the DOJ found it difficult to prosecute large
financial institutions when indications suggested that prosecution would
negatively impact the national or global economy.163 Then–Treasury Under
Secretary of the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen
also testified that the DOJ asked the Treasury to assess the economic impact
of prosecuting HSBC.164 Despite internal recommendations from DOJ’s
Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section in September 2012 to pursue
a guilty plea from HSBC,165 the DOJ entered into a DPA with the bank later
that year.166

and discretion with which they are provided” (quoting AUSTRALIAN GOV’T PRODUCTIVITY
COMM’N, IDENTIFYING AND EVALUATING REGULATORY REFORM, app. H (2011))).
155. Compare U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BUDGET IN BRIEF EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
(2014), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/266/1.%20Exec%20Summary%202014%20%20FINAL%20ok.pdf [https://perma.cc/KR3R-K7GJ], with U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
BUDGET IN BRIEF 1 (2020) [hereinafter 2020 BUDGET IN BRIEF], https://home.treasury.gov/
system/files/266/FY2020BIB.pdf [https://perma.cc/37H5-J4SX].
156. 2020 BUDGET IN BRIEF, supra note 155, at 1.
157. H.R. REP. NO. 116-617, at 2139 (2020) (Conf. Rep.).
158. See supra note 30.
159. See Lawsky, supra note 126.
160. Id.
161. See Skinner, supra note 22, at 13–15.
162. Id. at 15–16.
163. See TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 31, at 8.
164. Id. at 9–10.
165. Id. at 12–13, 39, 41.
166. See Press Release, supra note 143.
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Dubbed “Too Big to Jail” by some observers,167 critics—including Judge
Jed Rakoff of the Southern District of New York—see the overuse of DPAs
as prosecutors letting banks off the hook for BSA violations.168 In Judge
Rakoff’s view, such DPAs constitute “the cost of doing business rather than
a real punishment,” and his “single greatest objection” to BSA enforcement
is that the “ultimately responsible executives never get prosecuted at all.”169
Congress continues to assess the propriety of DPAs and NPAs in enforcing
the AML laws. The NDAA’s amendments require the attorney general to
submit a report to Congress every four years that lists the DPAs and NPAs
entered into, the justification for each agreement, the factors accounted for in
entering these agreements, and the extent of coordination between the
attorney general and the Treasury in reaching these agreements.170
Congress and the Treasury have created a complex and detailed regulatory
scheme in the BSA. In implementing this regime, enforcement authorities
must “balance specific economic efficiency . . . and professional rights to
self-governance with explicit requirements that society should not be held
responsible or liable for the failures of the former.”171 How federal
regulators decide to balance these concerns necessarily implicates the
volume and kinds of claims prosecuted under the BSA. Besides the extent
of enforcement, challenges faced by banks also contribute to the limitations
on BSA compliance.
2. Challenges to Creating a Culture of Compliance at Banks
On the other side of the regulatory equation are the regulated parties. The
BSA predominantly utilizes coercion to compel banks to enforce its
provisions—through duties to report suspicious activity or refrain from
participating in certain transactions.172 By choosing the stick over the carrot,
regulators have imposed on financial institutions the duty to police the
activity of their clients and avoid transactions with some parties altogether;

167. See, e.g., Danielle Douglas, Holder Concerned Megabanks Too Big to Jail, WASH.
POST (Mar. 6, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/holder-concernedmegabanks-toobig-to-jail/2013/03/06/6fa2b07a-869e-11e2-999e-5f8e0410cb9d_story.html
[https://perma.cc/Z3ZE-9B9L]; Victoria Finkle & Rob Blackwell, How Holder’s Surprising
‘Too Big to Jail’ Admission Changes Debate, AM. BANKER (Mar. 6, 2013),
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/how-holders-surprising-too-big-to-jail-admissionchanges-debate [https://perma.cc/4RLU-UYUP]; HSBC and Standard Chartered: Too Big to
Jail, ECONOMIST (Dec. 15, 2012), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2012/
12/15/too-big-to-jail [https://perma.cc/84MJ-N4BX].
168. Ben Hallman et al., 6 Money Laundering Reforms That Experts Say Need to Happen
Right Now, INT’L CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Oct. 19, 2020),
https://www.icij.org/investigations/fincen-files/6-money-laundering-reforms-that-expertssay-need-to-happen-right-now/ [https://perma.cc/2S93-A7VA].
169. Id.
170. See NDAA, Pub. L. No. 116-283, § 6311, 134 Stat. 3388, 4595 (2021).
171. O’Brien & Dixon, supra note 121, at 972.
172. See Bucy, supra note 23, at 852.
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thus, banks must spend resources on compliance functions, which may lead
the bank to refuse certain transactions and even close certain accounts.173
Financial institutions therefore have strong financial incentives—
particularly in the absence of sufficient enforcement—to underfund,
understaff, or otherwise neglect or even undermine their BSA compliance
function, even if it means an occasional fine.174 While HSBC forfeited a
then-record $1.9 billion in its 2012 DPA,175 its global assets of over
$2 trillion that year perhaps softened the blow.176
Furthermore, the problems presented by this incentive structure are
compounded at U.S. branches of global banks because such branches serve
“as a gateway into the U.S. financial system.”177 Absent strong global
governance, U.S. branches face significant challenges in processing
transactions from affiliate branches that are located abroad with different
AML and sanctions laws and that face less scrutiny and greater incentives to
process violative transactions through their U.S counterpart.178
B. Evaluating the NDAA’s Whistleblower Enhancements
As Congress modeled the NDAA’s additions to the BSA’s whistleblower
provisions on the 2010 enhancements to the SEC’s whistleblower
program,179 the critical reception to this program may provide some insight
into the potential impact of the newly amended BSA on AML enforcement.
The NDAA’s provisions differ from those found in the SEC program in one
key respect: the NDAA does not retain the 10-percent reward floor for
informants.180 This difference grants the secretary greater discretion to
provide lower rewards to informants in the BSA context than in the SEC
program.
Keeping this potential difference in mind, from a financial standpoint, the
SEC’s whistleblower program revisions have been an enormous success.
The program, formerly “practically unknown,”181 is now a mechanism that
the SEC has used to collect over $2 billion in monetary sanctions since its

173. See Michael Levi, Pecunia non olet: Cleansing the Money-Launderers from the
Temple, 16 CRIME, L. AND SOC. CHANGE 217, 217 (1991).
174. See O’Brien & Dixon, supra note 121, at 971–72; see also Hallman et al., supra note
168 (noting Judge Jed Rakoff’s observation that fines have “become in effect the cost of doing
business rather than a real punishment”). As one former HSBC employee observed, “[y]ou
can’t get a man to believe in something when a salary depends on him not believing it.”
Woodman, supra note 146.
175. See Press Release, supra note 143.
176. See HSBC HOLDINGS PLC, ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2012, at 374 (2012).
177. Press Release, S. Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, HSBC Exposed U.S.
Financial System to Money Laundering, Drug, Terrorist, Financing Risks (July 16, 2012),
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/media/hsbc-exposed-usfinacial-system-to-money-laundering-drug-terrorist-financing-risks [https://perma.cc/2BKKPZFD].
178. See O’Brien & Dixon, supra note 121, at 960–61.
179. See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
181. See U.S. SEC, supra note 85, at 4.
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inception.182 Awards have been made in relation to a variety of violations,
including tips about issuer reporting and disclosure requirements, offering
frauds and Ponzi schemes, and Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977183
(FCPA) violations.184 The SEC’s increase in antiretaliation enforcement
actions and efforts to prevent companies from placing restrictive
confidentiality agreements on employees and other potential whistleblowers
also suggest that the agency places high priority on the program.185
The program, however, is not without its faults. While whistleblower
attorneys can help screen tips for meritorious cases,186 the SEC routinely
receives thousands of tips, and only a small portion result in enforcement
actions. From August 2011 through 2019, the SEC received over 33,300
whistleblower tips.187 Yet, only sixty-seven informants received awards—
totaling approximately $387 million—during this same time period.188 Such
a high degree of meritless information may make the search for each credible
tip more difficult, thus necessitating greater investment in enforcement
staff.189
Under the BSA, increased information provided by whistleblowers
addresses only one side of the regulatory equation. Money laundering
detection is increasingly difficult, especially when regulators lack access to
financial records in shell jurisdictions.190 Even within U.S. jurisdictions,
compliance failures at banks can take years to root out.191 An increase in
whistleblower tips will aid enforcement in the above situations, but what of

182. See U.S. SEC, supra note 86, at 1. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates
that the NDAA’s amendments to the BSA will have a negligible net effect on the deficit. See
Letter from Phillip L. Swagel, Dir., Cong. Budget Off., to Hon. Mike Enzi, Chairman, U.S. S.
Comm. on the Budget, at 2 (Dec. 7, 2020), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/202012/hr6395paygoSenate_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SUP-BK2T] (“Division F would increase
direct spending by $283 million and increase revenues by that same amount.”).
183. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
184. See MICHAEL C. KELLY & MARISOL RAMIREZ, THE SEC’S WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM
IN 2016: HAS IT “HIT ITS STRIDE” AFTER FIVE YEARS? 3–4 (2016).
185. Id. at 4–6.
186. Id. at 7–8.
187. See U.S. SEC, supra note 86, at 22.
188. Id. at 1.
189. See Victor A. Razon, Note, Replacing the SEC’s Whistleblower Program: The
Efficacy of a Qui Tam Framework in Securities Enforcement, 47 PUB. CONT. L.J. 335, 347
(2018) (“Instead of using taxpayer dollars to hire additional enforcement staff, the SEC ought
to outsource some of its enforcement efforts to private parties.”).
190. See Havian & Ronickher, supra note 32. Ideally, the NDAA’s new provisions
regarding disclosure of beneficial owners will help buttress federal authorities’ efforts in
enforcing the AML laws against bad actors hiding behind shell companies formed in
U.S.-based jurisdictions or those formed abroad and registered in the United States, but the
effect of this revision remains to be seen. See NDAA, Pub. L. No. 116-283, §§ 6401–03, 134
Stat. 3388, 4604–25 (2021) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.).
191. See Havian & Ronickher, supra note 32 (“[I]t took a five-year investigation to root
out the bad behavior [at Standard Chartered], even though Standard Chartered was already
under a deferred prosecution agreement that required its cooperation and gave U.S. authorities
additional visibility into the bank.”).
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a scenario like the one Congress identified at HSBC?192 OCC examiners
identified many of the problems at the banking giant over a six-year period,
yet the OCC’s enforcement and supervisory arms failed to act.193 Though
federal regulators face staffing shortages at the enforcement level,194 the
same is not true of federal bank examiners tasked with reviewing financial
institutions’ BSA compliance programs—in 2019, the government employed
64,550 financial examiners, a 10-percent increase from the prior year.195
This suggests that while whistleblowers under this framework will likely help
glean more information from regulated parties, they will not substantially
increase federal enforcement.
C. The Efficacy of Qui Tam Enforcement of the Bank Secrecy Act
Following its groundbreaking investigation of money laundering and BSA
compliance at major financial institutions, the ICIJ interviewed several
industry experts who proposed a variety of reforms to combat money
laundering.196 These reforms included empowering banks’ BSA compliance
officers.197 Congress, too, appears in search of new ways to enforce the BSA.
The NDAA establishes the Subcommittee on Innovation and Technology
within the Treasury to “encourage and support technological innovation in”
AML efforts and provides for the appointment of BSA innovation officers at
banks.198 Qui tam actions can address both underenforcement by federal
regulators and malfeasance or negligence by financial institutions by
encouraging enforcement where regulatory resource shortages would
otherwise prevent actions, empowering BSA compliance officials at banks
by providing them a cause of action and incentivizing financial institutions
to take their BSA obligations more seriously. On the other hand, several
barriers exist to simply importing the FCA’s qui tam provisions into the BSA,
including the preservation of prosecutorial discretion, ensuring qui tam
actions do not unnecessarily burden BSA compliance responsibilities, and
maintaining confidentiality.
This section will first examine some of the benefits and problems arising
from qui tam actions under the FCA. It will then analyze how qui tam
provisions benefit BSA compliance and the issues posed by such a regime.
1. Critical Reception to Qui Tam Under the False Claims Act
Qui tam actions under the FCA are now commonly brought—
whistleblowers filed 633 suits in 2019 leading to the recovery of
192. See supra Part II.A.1.
193. See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., U.S.
VULNERABILITIES TO MONEY LAUNDERING, DRUGS, AND TERRORIST FINANCING: HSBC CASE
HISTORY 334 (2012).
194. See supra Part II.A.1.b.
195. See supra note 122.
196. See Hallman et al., supra note 168.
197. Id.
198. NDAA §§ 6207–6208, 31 U.S.C. § 5311 note.
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$2.1 billion.199 Although this data suggests qui tam has functioned as an
effective mechanism for the government to recover significant funds lost
through fraud by contracting partners, in-depth evaluations of qui tam
consider not only the purpose that private enforcement serves but also the
impact on the broader legal landscape.
Recoveries through qui tam actions inherently include other costs,
including the rewards given to informants and the impact of frivolous FCA
claims on courts and the public.200 To wit, the government paid $265 million
to whistleblowers in 2019,201 reducing the net gain to the government’s
coffers to $1.835 billion.202 Evaluating other, more nebulous costs can prove
difficult. While private enforcement by relators saves taxpayer dollars by
shifting litigation and detection costs onto private parties better positioned to
monitor misconduct, and by providing resources unavailable to enforcement
agencies, it can also disrupt public policy more broadly.203 As such, there is
disagreement as to whether enforcement through a civil cause of action is
more efficient than public enforcement on its own.204 For example, the cost
efficiency of private actions may be outweighed by settlement agreements
that do not consider the public interest.205
In an attempt to quantify some of these costs, Professor David Kwok
obtained raw data via Freedom of Information Act requests on qui tam
actions from 1986 to 2009.206 Professor Kwok sought to determine the
prevalence of frivolous FCA qui tam actions by identifying “filing mill” law
firms—those firms representing qui tam relators with a high number of case
filings but a low government intervention rate.207 Only two firms
demonstrated a high number of filings, and only one of these firms filed
claims that the government intervened in at rates lower than its average
27-percent intervention rate.208 Furthermore, the data indicated that, as firms
filed more qui tam actions, the government intervened at a higher rate,
suggesting that experience improved firms’ ability to identify and present
strong cases or that less successful firms stopped filing qui tam actions.209
Professor Kwok also determined that the government does not frequently
dismiss or delay its investigation of FCA cases.210 Ultimately, Professor
Kwok concluded that most firms do not pursue a “low-effort, high-volume”
199. See Press Release, supra note 120. The $2.1 billion amount recovered through qui
tam actions under the FCA made up the majority of the $3 billion recovered under the FCA
that year. Id.
200. See David Kwok, Evidence from the False Claims Act: Does Private Enforcement
Attract Excessive Litigation?, 42 PUB. CONT. L.J. 225, 226 (2013).
201. See Press Release, supra note 120.
202. See id.
203. See Kwok, supra note 200, at 230–31.
204. Id. at 231–32.
205. Id. at 232.
206. Id. at 238.
207. Id. at 240.
208. Id. at 241–42.
209. Id. at 243–44.
210. Id. at 245–47.
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case strategy and recommended further case studies to validate his
preliminary conclusions that the FCA’s qui tam provisions do not attract
excessive litigation.211
Another empirical analysis of FCA claims by Professor David Freeman
Engstrom also determined that the DOJ rarely uses its authority to terminate
qui tam actions brought by relators.212 Professor Engstrom, however,
advocated for greater DOJ screening on the merits as opposed to
interventions and terminations based on strategic concerns.213 In offering
guidance to those seeking to implement qui tam in other areas, such as
securities violations enforcement, Professor Engstrom posits several
enhancements, including incentivizing the agency to play a greater
gatekeeper role, reconsidering the FCA’s tiered bounty system so relators
with strong cases and sufficient resources can bring actions without DOJ
intervention, and mixing public and private enforcement instead of clearly
delineating responsibilities between the two.214 Indeed, some evidence
suggests that courts already interpret the DOJ declining to intervene as a
signal that a claim lacks merit.215
These analyses suggest that concerns over waste or abuse—while
understandable given the historical prevalence of such issues216—are
somewhat overstated, as DOJ intervention and dismissal rate data suggest
frivolous claims are not brought frequently.217 At the same time, the DOJ’s
rare use of dismissal and its low intervention rate can partly be explained by
the agency’s consideration of strategic, rather than merit-based, factors, as
well as the shortcomings inherent in the FCA’s incentive structure.218 The
FCA, then, presents an effective, if imperfect, model that has led to an
enormous financial return: under the FCA, the government recovered
$56 billion from 1986 to 2017,219 with a majority of this total coming from
qui tam actions.220 Indeed, in contrast to whistleblowing regimes that
provide only rewards, such as that at the SEC, qui tam claims are more likely
to be meritorious and contain better quality information precisely because of

211. Id. at 248–49.
212. See Engstrom, supra note 47, at 1749.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1751–54.
215. See Daniel Silver & Benjamin A. Berringer, Whistleblowers: The US Perspective, in
THE PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO GLOBAL INVESTIGATIONS 328, 342 & n.105 (Judith Seddon et
al. eds., 3d ed. 2019) (compiling cases).
216. See supra Part I.C.1.
217. See generally Kwok, supra note 200.
218. See Engstrom, supra note 47, at 1748–54.
219. See Silver & Berringer, supra note 215, at 340.
220. See Kwok, supra note 200, at 239 (finding $11.7 billion recovered via qui tam from
1986 to 2009); see also Michael J. Slattery, What DOJ’s FY 2018 False Claims Act Recovery
Statistics
Reveal,
BLANK
ROME
LLP
(Jan.
17,
2019),
https://governmentcontractsnavigator.com/2019/01/17/what-dojs-fy-2018-false-claims-actrecovery-statistics-reveal/ [https://perma.cc/3RB8-BA5D] (listing amounts totaling
approximately $16.1 billion in qui tam recovery from 2013 to 2017).
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the costs of bringing a claim imposed on the relator.221 Although the qui tam
model under the FCA holds promise as an effective tool to enforce the BSA,
concerns particular to the BSA and maintaining effective AML enforcement
must also be accounted for.
2. Potential Benefits and Challenges to Qui Tam Enforcement of the Bank
Secrecy Act
Despite a vast amount of literature on qui tam actions and several
proposals to expand the use of public-private enforcement into other
contexts,222 little has been written on the efficacy of qui tam in the BSA.
Professor Pamela Bucy argues against qui tam provisions in the AML
context.223 Much of Professor Bucy’s analysis, however, relates to a qui tam
scheme that deputizes the bankers and professionals who deal directly with
money launderers as private attorneys general to enforce the AML laws
against their clients or business partners.224 Professor Bucy convincingly
argues that such a regime would prove ineffective, as business incentives
would lead potential relators to prioritize client relationships over BSA
enforcement225 and because whistleblower protections in the AML context
would not suffice to address the harm done to the business’s reputation.226
But Professor Bucy’s argument speaks specifically to the applicability of
qui tam in enforcing the AML laws against money launderers. By contrast,
this Note focuses on qui tam’s potential to help enforce the BSA against
financial institutions lacking sufficient AML controls. In this context, the
potential attorneys general would primarily consist of bank employees,
particularly AML compliance officials, enforcing the BSA against their
employers—financial institutions who disregard or undermine their BSA
compliance duties and allow money laundering to flourish. This relationship
between bank employee and employer better resembles the typical
relationship between an FCA qui tam relator and defendant.227 As such,
whistleblower protections will help compensate for some of the damage done
to the employer-employee relationship.228 While Professor Bucy observes
that a single whistleblower is less likely to offer sufficient proof of AML
violations than an FCA relator due to the greater complexity of detecting

221. See Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, Noise Reduction: The Screening Value of
Qui Tam, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1169, 1216–17 (2014).
222. See Engstrom, supra note 47, at 1691 n.6 (compiling articles proposing public-private
enforcement regimes in securities regulation, environmental protection, civil rights, and tax);
see also Zachary M. Dayno, Private-Citizens Policing Corporate Behavior: Using a Qui Tam
Model to Catch Financial Fraud, 43 VT. L. REV. 307, 333–49 (2018); Razon, supra note 189,
at 347.
223. See Bucy, supra note 23, at 851–55.
224. Id. at 852.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 853.
227. Id. (“The qui tam plaintiff often will be an employee of the defendant and, it is likely,
will have had a long-standing relationship which will be jeopardized by the qui tam lawsuit.”).
228. Id.
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money laundering,229 BSA compliance staff are well positioned to evaluate
their own employers’ AML shortcomings. Financial institutions must
maintain AML programs that designate individuals responsible for
monitoring compliance with the BSA.230 This staff is directly responsible
for monitoring transactions for suspicious activity and updating customer
information to assess the risks customers pose.231 Financial institutions have
strong incentives to stymie the efforts of their BSA compliance functions.232
In such situations, BSA compliance staff need recourse to report wrongdoing.
In addition to empowering BSA compliance staff and incentivizing
compliance by regulated parties, qui tam also benefits BSA enforcement
through decreased reliance on regulatory agencies to bring actions. Private
enforcement can provide additional resources and expertise through capable
plaintiffs and circumvent regulators who are unwilling or unable to
effectively police regulated parties.233 BSA compliance staff have the
requisite expertise to understand a financial institution’s obligations under
the BSA by virtue of their positions. Moreover, qui tam provisions modeled
on the FCA have the additional benefit of mixing a degree of public oversight
with private enforcement. However, issues arise in finding the right balance
between the private enforcement goals of antiregulatory capture and cost
saving and the public interest in effectively gatekeeping meritless claims.234
Congress modeled the NDAA’s enhancements to the BSA’s whistleblower
rewards on the whistleblower program at the SEC.235 Indeed, several authors
have suggested improving the SEC program via the use of qui tam. One
observer has argued that a qui tam framework’s screening ability and its
imposition of professional and personal costs would improve the quality of
whistleblower information under the SEC’s program. 236 Another scholar has
proposed a modified qui tam model within section 922 of the Dodd-Frank
Act.237
Professor Bucy also raises other objections to a qui tam–style framework
in AML enforcement that reflect broader concerns about private
enforcement—namely, that such provisions remove prosecutorial discretion,
deter systematic development of the law, and interfere with, or duplicate, the
government’s ability to prosecute.238 These considerations, as well as more
229. Id.
230. See 31 C.F.R. § 1020.210 (2021).
231. Id.
232. See supra notes 174–77 and accompanying text.
233. See Engstrom, supra note 47, at 1690–91.
234. See id. at 1697–700. Engstrom identifies five core gatekeeper requirements an agency
would ideally perform: (1) terminating meritless or inefficient private actions to protect the
public interest, (2) policing collusion between private enforcers and defendants, (3) using
nonintervention as a means to signal skepticism about a claim, (4) intervening in strong cases
brought by under-resourced private enforcers, and (5) assisting claimants concerned about
retribution. Id.
235. See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text.
236. See Razon, supra note 189, at 348–50.
237. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6; 18 U.S.C. § 1514A; Dayno, supra note 222, at 333–49.
238. See Bucy, supra note 23, at 854–55.
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specific issues, will help guide the following discussion of some of the
limitations of adding a qui tam framework to the BSA: specifically, ensuring
relators’ suits do not preclude criminal enforcement, preserving
confidentiality, and maintaining effective BSA compliance at banks by
deterring abuse and circumvention of regular BSA compliance procedures.
a. Standing Issues and the Bank Secrecy Act’s Distinction Between Civil
and Criminal Liability
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of standing under the FCA in
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens.239
The Court had previously held that to establish Article III standing, a plaintiff
had to show injury in fact, causation, and redressability.240 Thus, relators
bringing suit under the FCA faced a potential standing problem in
demonstrating injury in fact, as exemplified by the respondent in the case
before the Court: Jonathan Stevens only asserted injury to the United States,
in the form of “injury to its sovereignty arising from violation of its laws . . .
and the proprietary injury resulting from the alleged fraud.”241 Thus, the qui
tam relator’s interest in recovering the bounty from a successful suit does not
suffice to confer standing, as such interest bears no relation to the actual
injury suffered by the United States.242
The Court, however, upheld the standing of the qui tam relator under a
partial assignment theory.243 Under this doctrine, the relator functions as an
assignee of a claim stemming from an injury suffered by the assignor (the
United States), and the assignor’s injury in fact confers standing on the qui
tam relator.244 The Court further buttressed this reasoning by looking to the
history of qui tam actions, finding that the historical prevalence of qui tam
statutes permitting informers who had suffered no injury to sue demonstrated
that qui tam actions constituted “cases and controversies of the sort
traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process” under Article
III.245
Incorporating qui tam into the BSA presents similar issues in
demonstrating injury in fact. As one author argues, under the reasoning of
Stevens, the government retains a partial interest due to the dual injuries
suffered: the injury to U.S. sovereignty stemming from the violation of its
laws, which cannot be assigned, and the injury to U.S. proprietary interests
stemming from the fraud, which is assigned to the relator.246 In the context
of the BSA, the United States retains the same injury to its sovereignty due
239. 529 U.S. 765 (2000).
240. Id. at 771.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 772.
243. Id. at 773.
244. Id. at 773–74.
245. Id. at 774, 777 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102
(1998)).
246. See Eric S. Askanase, Qui Tam and the False Claims Act: Criminal Punishment in
Civil Disguise, 70 DEF. COUNS. J. 472, 477 (2003).
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to a financial institution’s violations of the BSA, but the equivalent
proprietary interest transferred to the relator proves more difficult to discern.
However, as the Stevens court observed, “[t]he FCA can reasonably be
regarded as effecting a partial assignment of the Government’s damages
claim.”247 As such, it appears that damages arising from BSA violations may
be assignable.
Qui tam actions may also conflict with the double jeopardy clause when
not properly administered. In United States v. Halper,248 the Court held that
an FCA claim can give rise to a double jeopardy violation when a defendant
who has been punished in a criminal prosecution is subjected to an additional
civil sanction that is not remedial but instead serves as deterrence or
retribution.249 The Court later abrogated Halper in holding that a civil
sanction need not be solely remedial to avoid violating the double jeopardy
clause and offered a list of factors to determine whether civil penalties were
so punitive as to be criminal, rather than remedial, in nature.250 Because the
BSA also provides for criminal and civil penalties,251 careful drafting and
controls are necessary to ensure that a qui tam regime would not violate a
defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights.
b. The SAR Problem: Preserving Confidentiality
Among the many requirements imposed on banks, the BSA requires that
financial institutions “report any suspicious transaction relevant to a possible
violation of law or regulation.”252 The statute also prohibits financial
institutions and the government from notifying any party involved in a
transaction that the transaction had been reported.253 Regulations go a step
further in clarifying the scope and confidentiality of these SARs.
Regulations issued by the Treasury require every bank to file SARs with
FinCEN on transactions “relevant to a possible violation of law or
regulation”254 or on transactions of $5,000 or more that “the bank knows,
suspects, or has reason to suspect”: (1) stem from or disguise illegal
activities; (2) are designed to evade federal laws, regulations, or reporting

247. Stevens, 529 U.S. at 773 (emphasis added).
248. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
249. Id. at 448–49.
250. See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99–100 (1997). These factors include:
(1) “[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint”; (2)
“whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment”; (3) “whether it comes
into play only on a finding of scienter”; (4) “whether its operation will promote the
traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence”; (5) “whether the
behavior to which it applies is already a crime”; (6) “whether an alternative purpose
to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it”; and (7) “whether it
appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.”
Id. (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963)).
251. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 5321–5322.
252. Id. § 5318(g)(1).
253. Id. § 5318(g)(2)(A)(i)–(ii).
254. 31 C.F.R. § 1020.320(a)(1), (b)(1)–(2) (2021).
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requirements; or (3) have no apparent business or lawful purpose.255 SARs
form “the cornerstone of the BSA reporting system,” as U.S. law
enforcement agencies utilize the information contained in SARs filed by
banks to “combat terrorism, terrorist financing, money laundering, and other
financial crimes.”256
The regulations prioritize maintaining the
confidentiality of sensitive information contained in SARs: if subpoenaed,
financial institutions must decline to produce a SAR or admit that a SAR on
a transaction had even been prepared or filed.257 Banks, however, may
disclose a SAR to FinCEN, law enforcement agencies, state and federal
authorities that administer examinations pursuant to the BSA, other financial
institutions in preparation of a joint SAR, and banks may also disclose a SAR
in connection with employment references or termination notices.258
Consider a scenario under a qui tam action brought for violations of the
BSA. A bank files several SARs on Customer A over a short time period on
the basis that the transactions involve shell jurisdictions and serve no clear
business purpose, thus suggesting a high risk of money laundering. In a
monthly risk committee meeting, the committee decides to retain Customer
A. Subsequent to this decision, the bank processes more transactions from
the customer, involving the same shell jurisdictions and similar indicia of
money laundering. These transactions are all flagged as high-risk by the
bank’s transaction monitoring software, and several employees in the bank’s
BSA compliance function recommend that a SAR be filed. However, these
recommendations are quashed at the highest levels of the bank. A mid-level
BSA compliance officer is rebuffed when the officer raises this issue with his
superiors. Eventually, the officer files a qui tam action in federal court
alleging violations of the BSA related to these transactions and the bank’s
lack of customer due diligence procedures. How much of the above
information from the SAR can the relator’s complaint include? Enforcement
by private attorneys general will thus implicate confidentiality concerns
unique to the BSA’s compliance regime.259
c. Maintaining Effective Bank Secrecy Act Compliance
Extending the authority to bring actions under the BSA to private attorneys
general risks overenforcement.260 Qui tam may undermine BSA compliance
by (1) pushing banks to file more defensive SARs that are less useful to law
enforcement agencies or (2) pushing bank employees to file qui tam actions
instead of adhering to bank BSA compliance procedures.

255. See id. § 1020.320(a)(2).
256. FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 59, at 60.
257. See 12 C.F.R. § 21.11(k) (2021) (national banks); id. § 163.180(d)(12) (savings
associations); id. § 208.62(j) (state banks); 31 C.F.R. § 1020.320(e) (2021) (financial
institutions broadly).
258. See 31 C.F.R. § 1020.320(e)(1)(ii)(A)–(B).
259. See infra Part III.B.
260. See supra note 127.
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Overenforcement does not only refer to excessive sanctions, such as
unjustifiably long prison sentences or high fines but also the secondary
effects on the sanctioned party.261 In the context of BSA enforcement,
reputational harm stemming from a criminal or civil investigation may cause
a bank’s stock value to decline.262 In addition to such financial effects,
termed “market spillover,” overbroad enforcement can capture conduct not
justified by the purpose of the BSA, known as “definitional spillover.”263
Still, some market spillover is justifiable. If qui tam actions only resulted in
fines, the deterrent effect would be weaker than if banks also faced
market-based pressures for their BSA compliance failures and would
“trivialize the normative message” that the BSA intends to convey—namely,
that banks ought to maintain effective AML programs to assist law
enforcement in detecting criminal behavior.264
Qui tam enforcement of the BSA also implicates unjustifiable definitional
spillover. Banks already file “defensive SARs” out of an abundance of
caution when the activity at issue raises few concerns, but to avoid regulatory
action, the bank files a SAR with FinCEN.265 The quality of SARs is just as,
if not more, important than the quantity of SARs filed, and evidence suggests
defensive filing makes for weaker SARs and less effective AML systems.266
FinCEN received over 2.3 million SARs in 2019, with over one million of
these filed by banks.267 Law enforcement agencies should be able to utilize
information in SARs to combat the underlying criminal activity, instead of
wasting time and resources searching for substantive SARs that are buried
like needles in a haystack of defensive reports. Faced with the threat of qui
tam actions if they choose not to file SARs on transactions that border on
regulatory standards for suspicious activity, banks may elect to file reports
anyway. Increased enforcement of the BSA via qui tam actions could thus
provide greater incentives for banks to file defensive SARs in the absence of
demonstrated, robust public oversight of private actions.

261. See, e.g., Bierschbach & Stein, supra note 127, at 1751.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1748. For example, a strict fifty-five mile per hour speed limit intends to limit
dangerous driving, but it may also capture defendants driving safely above the speed limit. Id.
264. Id. at 1751.
265. See James DeFrantz, When to Hold ‘Em and When to File ‘Em—A Two-Part Series
on SAR Filings: The Decision, ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FIN. CRIME SPECIALISTS (Mar. 24, 2016),
https://www.acfcs.org/when-to-hold-em-and-when-to-file-em-a-two-part-series-on-sarfilings-the-decision/ [https://perma.cc/5DDX-SPBU]; see also Matthew Collin, What the
FinCEN Leaks Reveal About the Ongoing War on Dirty Money, BROOKINGS INST. (Sept. 25,
2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/09/25/what-the-fincen-leaks-revealabout-the-ongoing-war-on-dirty-money/ [https://perma.cc/NU22-UU6D].
266. See generally Brigitte Unger & Frans Van Waarden, How to Dodge Drowning in
Data: Rule- and Risk-Based Anti Money Laundering Policies Compared, 5 REV. L. & ECON.
953 (2009) (examining the over-reporting of suspicious activity under the AML laws and
contrasting the Netherlands’s risk-based approach with the rules-based approach used in the
United States).
267. See
Suspicious
Activity
Report
Statistics
(SAR
Stats),
FINCEN,
https://www.fincen.gov/reports/sar-stats [https://perma.cc/88ZC-TEGF] (last visited Oct. 29,
2021).
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At the other end of the spectrum, banks are a valuable source of
information on suspected criminal activity when they comply with the BSA.
An oft-cited criticism of qui tam is the potential for abuse.268 An undesirable
result under the BSA would involve an employee bypassing a bank’s regular
compliance procedures to file a qui tam action, thus burdening the bank with
litigation in pursuit of a bounty instead of allowing the bank’s good-faith
efforts to comply with its AML obligations to proceed.
III. A PROPOSED QUI TAM MODEL UNDER THE BSA
The regulation of banks under the BSA is a complicated endeavor—one
that involves regular reporting and reviews by banks’ BSA/AML compliance
departments, regular examinations by banking authorities, and enforcement
actions by a variety of federal agencies, most notably FinCEN and the
DOJ.269 Bank compliance departments face a difficult task in monitoring
transactions and customer accounts for suspicious activity and institutional
risk, a task made all the more difficult when banks neglect, understaff, or
override the recommendations of the compliance function.270 A small staff
at FinCEN both reviews SARs filed by banks and sanctions banks when they
fail to comply with the BSA.271 Furthermore, when FinCEN or DOJ
enforcement officials weigh bringing civil or criminal actions against
noncompliant banks, they consider not only the important role banks play in
AML monitoring and the associated need to deter defensive SAR filings272
but arguably the systemic economic effects that may result from such actions,
as well.273
A qui tam model addresses the above issues through its combination of
private and public enforcement. Qui tam would serve to empower bank BSA
compliance officials—the people best situated to bring such actions by nature
of their positions—at noncompliant banks. Qui tam would also supplement
understaffed federal agencies while preserving a greater degree of
prosecutorial discretion than a purely private model. However, simply
transplanting the FCA’s qui tam model onto the BSA poses double
jeopardy,274 confidentiality,275 and potential abuse problems.276
Furthermore, much literature has examined and critiqued qui tam
enforcement under the FCA; a model based on the FCA ought to draw from
these critiques and not repeat the same mistakes. This part incorporates the
various benefits and limitations explored above into a functional outline for
a qui tam model in the BSA.

268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

See discussion supra note 94 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part II.A.2.
See supra notes 59, 265, 267 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 265–68 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 163–64 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.C.2.a.
See supra Part II.C.2.b.
See supra Part II.C.2.c.
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A. Revisions to the Agency Intervention Process
Qui tam actions under the BSA should provide a longer time frame for
FinCEN to decide whether to intervene or refer the case to the DOJ to
prosecute the case criminally. Under the FCA, the government has sixty days
to intervene or allow relators to conduct the action on their own.277 The
government can intervene in an action to prosecute the claim, dismiss the
action, or settle with the defendant.278 Increasing the time frame for
FinCEN’s initial decision to intervene in a BSA qui tam action accomplishes
two goals: (1) reducing the likelihood of a double jeopardy issue and (2)
emphasizing the agency’s gatekeeper role.
Unlike the FCA, the BSA imposes different degrees of civil and criminal
liability depending on the mens rea of the violator and the particular statutory
or regulatory provisions violated.279 Although the BSA permits the
imposition of a civil penalty for the same violation that gave rise to a criminal
penalty,280 qui tam actions could complicate such a scenario.281 Under the
Hudson factors,282 the BSA’s civil penalties are likely to be found punitive
in nature. Many of the civil penalties articulated in the BSA require “willful”
actions283 and thus “come[] into play only on a finding of scienter.”284 While
the statute calculates some penalties based on the amount of the transactions
that the bank processed in violation of the BSA,285 such a foundation does
not make the penalties “remedial” in nature, given that the processed
transactions do not constitute a loss to any single party in need of restitution.
Furthermore, many of the civil penalties articulated under the BSA do not
bear any relation to the amount of the transaction and merely serve to punish
previous violators and deter future ones.286 Increasing the time for FinCEN
to intervene can help assuage double jeopardy concerns by clearly
delineating between criminal actions brought by the DOJ and civil actions
pursued by FinCEN and qui tam relators.
An increased intervention time frame that includes criminal referral serves
functionalist ends, as well. Qui tam actions would likely increase the amount
of civil claims brought; such an increase in civil enforcement should not
come at the expense of appropriate criminal enforcement, particularly in light
of criticisms that enforcement authorities have been too lax in prosecuting
BSA violations, as best exemplified in the HSBC case.287 Under an effective
277. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4).
278. Id. § 3730(c)(1), (2)(A)–(B).
279. Id. §§ 5321–5322.
280. Id. § 5321(d).
281. See supra Part II.C.2.a.
282. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
283. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(1), (5)(C). Some penalties do not require any finding
of mental state, see id. § 5321(a)(2)–(5)(B), or penalize negligent violations, see id.
§ 5321(a)(6).
284. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997).
285. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(1), (4)(B) (establishing penalties of up to $100,000 per
transaction for violations of the BSA).
286. Id. § 5321(a)(2)–(3), (5).
287. See supra notes 167–69 and accompanying text.
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private-public enforcement model, the regulators should instead leverage the
increase in resources provided by private attorneys general to focus their
enforcement efforts on prosecuting more egregious violations of the BSA and
fulfilling their gatekeeper role in managing claims brought by qui tam
relators.288 An increased time frame would allow FinCEN to protect the
public interest through the termination of meritless or inefficient private
actions and targeting potential criminal actions for prosecution by the
DOJ.289 A qui tam relator whose claim is terminated and referred for
criminal prosecution should still qualify as an original source eligible for a
reward to incentivize such claims. In such a situation, the NDAA’s
whistleblower reward structure should control.290
B. Confidentiality Controls
The gatekeeper agency should strive to keep confidential information
under seal, while broadening the scope of permissible SAR disclosures to
include qui tam relators. Though current regulations call for sweeping
confidentiality of SARs, banks may still disclose “[a] SAR or any
information that would reveal the existence of a SAR” to regulatory and law
enforcement agencies involved in BSA compliance.291 Banks also can
disclose the “underlying facts, transactions, and documents upon which a
SAR is based” to other financial institutions for the filing of a joint SAR.292
Because a qui tam relator functions as an assignee of the government’s
interests,293 for the purposes of SAR disclosure, it follows that the relator
would be included among the parties to which banks, upon request or
demand, could disclose a SAR. Nevertheless, robust public oversight of qui
tam claims includes ensuring the continued confidentiality of SARs where
appropriate.
In the first instance, a qui tam relator whose information includes, for
example, a failure by the bank to file SARs or to offboard customers who
engage in activity that has given rise to several SAR filings, will not be able
to include a SAR itself among the evidence in the initial complaint. If the
relator serves, as is contemplated, as a BSA compliance official at a bank,
the relator likely has “information that would reveal the existence of a
SAR”294 or a contemplated SAR filing or “underlying facts”295 that
supported or should have supported a SAR. The statute and associated
regulations should be amended to permit inclusion of such information in a
qui tam complaint. Additionally, the increased intervention time described
in Part III.A will also provide FinCEN assistance here: the agency must take
care to ensure not only that meritorious claims stand but also that confidential
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

See Engstrom, supra note 47, at 1697–700.
See id. at 1697–98.
See NDAA § 6314(a), 31 U.S.C. 5323.
31 C.F.R. § 1020.320(e)(1)(ii)(A)(1) (2021).
Id. § 1020.320(e)(1)(ii)(A)(2).
See supra notes 243–47 and accompanying text.
31 C.F.R. § 1020.320(e)(1)(ii)(A)(1).
Id. § 1020.320(e)(1)(ii)(A)(2).

1394

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

information therein remains confidential to protect possible future civil and
criminal investigations into parties subject to SAR filings.
C. Restrictions on Permitted Classes of Qui Tam Relators
The BSA’s qui tam provisions should incorporate the NDAA’s restrictions
denying awards to certain classes of whistleblowers to the same classes of
qui tam relators, as well as expand the kinds of relators that are prevented
from bringing claims, to better deter abuse.296 The NDAA bars government
employees—those convicted of related criminal violations, those who submit
information by different means than regulations the secretary may
implement, and those who provide false information—from receiving awards
as whistleblowers.297 To prevent abuse, the BSA should prevent the same
classes from bringing claims as qui tam relators.
Furthermore, the qui tam provisions should also bar any bank employee
who has failed to follow internal bank BSA compliance procedures from
bringing a claim, provided these procedures constitute a good faith effort to
comply with the BSA and do not merely serve as an obstacle to—or an undue
burden on—potential qui tam actions. Ideally, this restriction would curb
abuse by preventing qui tam relators from end-running internal bank
procedures for the reporting of suspicious activity.
D. Changes to the Qui Tam Reward Structure
The incentive structure of the FCA that provides the relator with a greater
percentage of the proceeds of the action or settlement if the government
declines intervention than if it intervenes does not necessarily align with the
strength of the claim.298 To incentivize greater agency participation and
optimize the efficiency of the public-private enforcement mechanism, this
Note adopts two revisions proposed by Professor Engstrom. First, the tiered
bounty system—originally devised to incentivize relators to bring claims that
an overly cautious or captured agency would reject—has made it less likely
for agencies to delegate enforcement to competent private attorneys general,
thus undermining one of the principal benefits of qui tam enforcement.299
Qui tam relators under the BSA should receive the same reward regardless
of intervention by the agency. Second, to engender the robust gatekeeper
role required to allay the concerns discussed above, a qui tam model for the
BSA should induce the agency to utilize its termination and intervention
powers by holding the agency jointly liable for prevailing defendants’ fees in
declined cases.300 Ideally, such provisions would incentivize competent
private attorneys general to pursue meritorious claims without the need for
agency resources, while inducing FinCEN to intervene and dismiss meritless
cases.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

See supra notes 71, 80–81 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 71, 80–81 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
This Note seeks to improve enforcement of the BSA. The BSA has created
a complex statutory and regulatory scheme that requires banks to maintain
staff to monitor transactions for money laundering, report suspicious activity,
and conduct due diligence on their customers.301 Despite the crucial role
banks play in AML enforcement, FinCEN—the primary federal agency
tasked with sanctioning banks that fail to comply with their BSA
obligations—routinely faces staff and resource shortages.302 In addition,
FinCEN and the DOJ have drawn criticism for several high-profile
prosecutions that have ended in DPAs, and as some argue, less punishment
than necessary to effectively enforce the BSA.303 Banks, for their part,
sometimes neglect or undermine their BSA compliance staff.304 While the
revisions under the NDAA represent a step in the right direction through the
increase in FinCEN’s funding, the provision of greater rewards and guidance
to the agency’s whistleblower program, increased penalties, and greater
insight into beneficial owners,305 these provisions do not address instances
where regulators have declined to bring down the hammer on banks that have
violated the BSA.
Against this backdrop, a qui tam model empowers BSA compliance staff
by deputizing them as private enforcers and spurs increased enforcement,
while retaining public oversight of these actions to ensure that only
meritorious claims are prosecuted and that banks’ BSA compliance functions
can still effectively operate.
While this Note has attempted to anticipate some of the difficulties in
adapting the FCA’s qui tam model to the BSA, further scholarship is
necessary to examine the efficacy of this proposed model more fully.
Similarly, more comprehensive data analysis is needed to determine whether
current levels of enforcement are adequate to ensure compliance with the
BSA. Furthermore, this Note neither examines the validity of the “too big to
fail” theory or potential resolutions to issues posed by financial institutions
that have perceived systemic importance nor comments on the complications
posed by state enforcement of the BSA. These questions will no doubt affect
federal enforcement of the BSA going forward. This Note has hopefully
added to the ongoing conversation about how to best prevent bad actors from
utilizing the U.S. financial system to advance or profit from criminal activity.
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